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SECURITY OF THE CAO-LI PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
LEK-HENG LIM
Abstract. We show that the Cao-Li cryptosystem proposed in [1] is not se-
cure. Its private key can be reconstructed from its public key using elementary
means such as LU -decomposition and Euclidean algorithm.
1. Description of the Cryptosystem
The Cao-Li public key cryptosystem was first proposed in [1]. It encrypts mes-
sages using a bilinear form that is chosen to permit easy decryption by the Chinese
remainder theorem. Public key cryptosystems that are designed along this line are
not uncommon in the Chinese cryptographic literature. However, as most of the
original papers were published in Chinese, they remained relatively obscure until
a few of them were described in [2] (in English) recently. Our description below is
based on the latter reference.
Let p1, . . . , pn be n distinct primes where pi ≡ 3 (mod 4). For i = 1, . . . , n,
define
mi :=
1
pi
(
n∏
j=1
pj
)
.
Compute for each mi, an integer m
′
i that satisfies m
′
imi ≡ 1 (mod pi) and 0 <
m′i < pi. We define positive integers
λi := m
′
imi
for i = 1, . . . , n and the diagonal matrix
Λ := diag [λ1, . . . , λn] .
Note that
λi ≡ δij (mod pj)(1)
where δij is 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
We choose another two invertible n×n lower-triangular matrices P1 and P2 with
non-negative integer entries that are bounded by
β := min
1≤i≤n
√
pi
i(i+ 1)d
(2)
where d ≥ 1 is a chosen positive integer.
The secret key comprises the two matrices P1, P2 and the primes pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
The public key is the n× n symmetric matrix B given by
B := PT2 P
T
1 ΛP1P2.
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Let the message block be x = (x1, . . . , xn) where 0 ≤ xi ≤ d. The ciphertext y is
computed as
y = xBxT .
If we let z := xPT2 P
T
1 , then
y = zΛzT = λ1z
2
1 + · · ·+ λnz
2
n.
From (1), we have
z2k ≡ y (mod pk).(3)
Keeping in mind that PT1 and P
T
2 are upper-triangular and their entries are non-
negative and bounded by β, we have, from (2) and 0 ≤ xi ≤ d, that
0 ≤ zk ≤
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=i
dβ2 = dβ2
k(k + 1)
2
<
pk
2
.(4)
We can carry out decryption as follows. For each k = 1, . . . , n, compute the unique
zk satisfying (3) and (4). The message can then be recovered by
x = z
(
PT2 P
T
1
)−1
.(5)
Note that since pk ≡ 3 (mod 4), effective algorithms for computing square roots
(mod pk) exist (see [3]).
2. Key Recovery
We will first recover Λ from B. Let P1P2 =: P = (pij)1≤i,j≤n. Then P is an
invertible lower-triangular matrix with non-negative integral entries by the same
properties of P1 and P2. Since P is invertible and has non-negative integral entries,
we have detP = 1. Moreover, we also have detP = p11 × · · · × pnn since P
is triangular. As all the pii’s are non-negative, it then follows that pii = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Λ and P can be recovered from B using an algorithm that is very similar to
the algorithm for LU -decomposition of a matrix (the difference being that row
reduction is done starting from the bottom rows). Denote the ith row of B by
bi = (bi1, . . . , bin), i = 1, . . . , n. We know immediately that bnn = λn.
Algorithm A
Input. B = (b1, . . . ,bn)
T = (bij)1≤i,j≤n
Output. λ1, . . . , λn, P
Step 1. for i = n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1 do
for j = n, n− 1, . . . , i+ 1 do
bi ← bi −
bji
bjj
bj ;
end;
end;
Step 2. for i = 1, . . . , n do
λi ← bii;
bi ← bi/λi;
end;
P ← B;
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The following shows that Algorithm A indeed yields the required output. Let
the ith row of P be pi, i = 1, . . . , n. Since pji = 0 if j < i and pii = 1, we may
write bi = λipi +
∑n
j=i+1 λjpjipj . For each i = n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1, the inner loop
of Step 1 effectively does
bi ← bi −
n∑
j=i+1
bji
bjj
bj .
We shall show inductively that bi is reduced to λipi at stage i: clearly bn = λnpn;
suppose bi is reduced to λipi at stage i = n− 1, . . . , n− k, then at stage n− k− 1,
bn−k−1 ← bn−k−1 −
n∑
j=n−k
bji
bjj
bj
= bn−k−1 −
n∑
j=n−k
λjpjipj
= λn−k−1pn−k−1.
Hence Step 1 reduces B = (b1, . . . ,bn)
T to (λnpn, . . . , λnpn)
T = ΛP . Since
the diagonal entries of P are all 1’s, the diagonal entries of ΛP are the required
λi’s. Consequently, P can be recovered by dividing each row by its corresponding
diagonal entry.
We can now recover the moduli p1, . . . , pn from λ1, . . . , λn. From (1), we see
that for a fixed i, pi | λj for all j 6= i and pi | λi − 1. So
pi | di := gcd(λ1, . . . , λi−1, λi − 1, λi+1, . . . , λn).
It could of course happen that di 6= pi for some i. So this process only partially
recovers the pi’s. However our computer simulations (using C++ with LiDIA) show
that instances where di 6= pi are rare. We shall give some heuristics to substantiate
this claim. For di = pi, it is sufficient that gcd(m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
i−1,m
′
i+1, . . . ,m
′
n) = 1.
From [4], we have
#
{
(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ N
k
∣∣ gcd(a1, . . . , ak) = 1, all ai ≤ N}
=
{
Nk/ζ(k) + O(Nk−1) if k > 2,
6N2/pi2 +O(N logN) if k = 2.
where ζ(s) =
∑∞
i=1 i
−s is the Riemann zeta function. Assuming that each m′i is
randomly distributed in {1, . . . , N} where N := max{p1, . . . , pn}, the probability
that gcd(m′1, . . . ,m
′
i−1,m
′
i+1, . . . ,m
′
n) = 1 is then at least ζ(n − 1) ≥ 6/pi
2 ≈ 0.60
when N is large enough. So we can expect to recover more than half of the pi’s.
In fact our simulations show that we almost always have di = pi and many of the
rare exceptions are of the form di = 2pi where pi can also be recovered easily.
3. Conclusion
Note that Algorithm A is essentially LU -decomposition and the di’s can be
computed using the Euclidean algorithm. Since these two methods can be carried
out efficiently, we can easily recover P and most of the pi’s. It then follows that
the Cao-Li cryptosystem is insecure and thus should not be used.
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